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Reforming the contemporary monetary and financial system 
has come under the limelight with the onset of the last 
international financial crisis. Zarlenga and Poteat focus on 
the elimination of credit money and the return to of the 
exclusive right of issuing money to the government as a key 
to reforming the system. In this comment, I argue that they 
are right, but reform should be wider and more 
comprehensive. My arguments are inspired by Al-Jarhi’s 
model of an Islamic monetary system (1981).   
 
The authors and I are in agreement that the essence of the 
medium of exchange lies neither in the law nor in the 
physical attributes of money, but rather in its general 
acceptability. The physical attributes as well as law 
enforcement do not create but may reinforce general 
acceptability but neither would be sufficient to keep public 
interest in using money. 
An interesting point the authors make is debunking the old 
textbook concept of derivative deposits being created from 
primary deposits1. They claim that banks create money out 
of thin air through the process of lending, based on 
profitability expectations. The availability of reserves is of 
little concern, as the central bank accommodates the supply 
of money desired by banks through its discount window and 
                                                 
1 This could render the concepts of reserve money, high-powered money and the monetary base 
out of fashion. 
open market operations, paying attention solely to setting its 
target level of interest rate. 
The authors focus on the redistributive effects of credit 
money creation. I have for a long time adopted this view that 
credit money creation is a channel through which banks 
usurp seigniorage, which should be the exclusive right of the 
public who gave money its ability to serve as a medium of 
exchange through general acceptability.   
The authors highlight bankers’ “transgressions” as a result 
of such wealth redistribution, using savings and loan 
associations as an example. I would add to this the record of 
banks practicing predatory lending as well as the devious 
ways of securitizing subprime debt, especially during the 
years preceding the international financial crisis.  Wealth 
redistribution from the public to banks is carried to extreme, 
when the instability of banks, which is a self-inflicted 
backlash of the system, costs the public astronomical 
amount of resources to save banks from downfalls. 
The authors, however, ignore how money, once created is 
used. Conventionally, money even when created exclusively 
by government will be used to finance the deficit, 
encouraging unjustifiable expansion of government 
expenditures which is often subject to tremendous waste2. 
Al-Jarhi’s model (1981) proposes that such newly issued 
money would be placed in profit-and-loss-sharing, PLS, 
investment accounts with banks, which would be used to 
finance private and government investment and 
                                                 
2 It is astonishing that in an Islamic state, Awqaf, or charitable foundations providing health and 
education services and supporting scientific research are encouraged. Past experience in old 
Muslem societies indicate that the burden of government in this field has been significantly 
reduced. This would undoubtedly reduce the need to of the government to incur a deficit. 
consumption activities, based on economic feasibility (or 
investment) criteria.  
The government can obtain seigniorage in the form of a profit 
share on its invested funds. In addition, the government can 
issue central investment certificates, or CDC's whose 
proceeds would also be allocated between banks according 
to efficiency criteria to be invested. The rate of return on 
CDC's would replace the nominal rate of interest, which 
would be market (and not policy) determined. CDC's would 
be traded in open market as an interbank tool and a 
monetary policy instrument, replacing government bonds. 
Such arrangements would make money serve as equity-
shares in national output. Its rate of growth would be tied to 
the real rate of growth of the economy. Monetary policy will 
finally break loose of political factors. 
Limiting the problem of the current monetary system to the 
fact that banks create money indicates that the authors have 
not gone far enough3. The most important issue that I have 
repeatedly emphasized is that the system creates and 
allocates financial resources, based on borrowing criteria. 
According to the classical loan contract, a deposit with the 
bank is a loan, which the bank guarantees to repay in 
principle and interest. Payment of a positive interest rate 
entices economic agents to reduce the monetary balances 
they use in transactions in order to increase their interest 
income. This is compensated for by using real resources 
withdrawn from the commodity sector to increase the 
velocity of money used in transactions. Substituting real 
resources for money reduces total output and efficiency. 
This point was made by Milton Friedman (1969), upon which 
                                                 
3 Many things happened since the Chicago plan that served as eye-openers for making the plan 
more comprehensive and effective. 
he based his optimum monetary policy rule. Based on the 
Fisher’s equation, Friedman proposes to deflate the economy 
at a rate equal to the real rate of interest, in order to bring 
the nominal rate down to zero. 
When this matter was investigated within general 
equilibrium models, it was found that a zero interest rate is 
both necessary and sufficient for allocative efficiency (Cole 
and Kocherlakota, 1998; Wilson, 1979).  Though these 
theoretical results are dependent on some simplifying 
assumptions, they are robust in a variety of models (Correia 
and Teles, 1997).  They imply that the long forgotten 
Christian and Jewish teachings as well as those of Islam, 
Buddhism and Hinduism that prohibit the charge of interest 
on loans are not an aberration.  It is amazing to see such 
religious teaching stay valid after so many centuries. 
However, Friedman’s “final” rule for optimum quantity of 
money served as a red herring to direct attention from the 
fact that the monetary system based on interest is basically 
flawed. Reducing the nominal rate of interest to zero will not 
solve the problem, but will surround the economy with 
liquidity and saving-investment traps. It is interesting that 
in Islam, providing interest-free loans is an act of charity 
that cannot be suitable for financing investment and 
consumption.  
In addition, the classical loan contract itself is subject to 
inherent risks because of its association with information 
asymmetry. It makes it especially exposed to the risks of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in addition to the usual 
credit risks. Why economists have not directed their 
attention to alternative finance contracts is puzzling. 
Islamic economists propose 16 contracts to replace the 
classical loan contract4. Some are based on partnership in 
profit and product. Some are based on investment agency 
and the rest are based on sale and lease arrangements. Five 
of such contracts are subject to information asymmetry, 
while the remaining eleven are not. This means that 
information asymmetry can be easily avoided by mixing and 
matching between the 16 contracts. This is similar to the 
behavior of universal banking, as originally practiced in 
some non-Anglo-Saxon countries, where equity finance is 
matched with debt finance. 
Another side of the current system relates to the fact that 
debt markets are integrated into one, where debt in the 
forms of bonds is freely tradable. This market serves as an 
attractive space for hot money, which eventually becomes a 
hotbed for instability and contagion. An added feature is the 
liberty to trade in risk, which blows up the size of the 
financial sector out of proportion, to become the tail that 
wags the dog. 
Islamic economics prohibits trading in debt, as it amounts 
to trading present against future money. The debt resulting 
from Islamic finance cannot be gathered for trading in one 
integrated market. Added to this, when Islamic finance 
results into debt owed by one of the parties, the amount of 
debt is fixed from the very beginning and is not subject to 
increase even in cases where debtors face temporary 
illiquidity and require rescheduling. Only delinquent debtors 
are subject to penalties to be paid to charities and not to 
banks. 
                                                 
4 Providing such contracts as alternatives to the classical loan contract, and their use in the 
Islamic world for hundreds of years is perhaps the reason behind the name of “Islamic 
economics.” Otherwise, calling it “Jewish” or Christian” economics would have been appropriate.  
Financial markets under the proposed reform will contain 
only equity-based instruments, like shares, Sukuk, 
investment certificates, fund shares, etc. Such financial 
instruments are issued by government, central banks, 
corporations, Awqaf foundations and Zakah institutions. 
Market trading would be limited to spot and deferred price 
or delivery contracts but not futures or derivatives. Financial 
markets would cease to be the gambling casinos and the 
financial sector would cease to dwarf the commodity sector. 
Perhaps the most unfortunate thing about Islamic 
economics that it has not been in practice for decades. 
Limited attempts for its revival in the area of Islamic finance 
have been marred by anomalies due to malpractice. The 
major culprit is the lack of interest on the side of central 
banks to properly regulate the Islamic finance industry. In 
addition, the establishment of foundations to provide health 
and educational services has been curtailed by 
governmental jealousy of an Islamic revival. 
We can therefore propose the expansion of the Chicago plan 
to include the features explained above. This would improve 
economic efficiency, stability and compactness and close 
most of the many doors through which crises break into the 
economy. We can summarize the proposed reforms inspired 
by Islamic economics as: 
1. Replacing the classical loan contract by the 16 Islamic 
finance contract, 
2. Exclusive monopoly of the issuing of money through a 
government-owned central bank, 
3. All issued money is to be placed in PLS investment 
accounts with banks, 
4. The central bank issues central investment certificates, to 
be held by banks and the public and traded in an open 
market as an interbank and monetary policy instrument, 
5. Debt trading as well as the use of all risk-trading contracts 
is prohibited in financial markets, 
6. Debtors would be granted free rescheduling in case of 
temporary illiquidity, but penalized in case of delinquency. 
This would be a radical transformation of the current system 
to another system that is more efficient, stable and compact. 
In order to illustrate this point. Suppose this modified 
system faces a natural catastrophe, how would it confront 
it? 
First, debtors facing temporary illiquidity would be granted 
free rescheduling, aggregate demand would not significantly 
fall. The danger of recession is minimized. 
Second, since predatory finance is non-existent, investors 
who obtained finance will be able to recover gradually. 
Financial instruments may suffer some price reduction, but 
financial markets would remain resilient.  
The central bank can increase its central deposits with 
banks to relief liquidity problems without have to spend 
billions to bail out banks. 
In summary, the economy would face such catastrophe 
much better and with less pain than the current structure.  
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